

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Implications of Renewing US Military Ties with Indonesia**

by

LTC Christine M. Gayagas  
US Army

Dr. Robin Dorff  
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No.  
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Implications of Renewing US Military Ties with Indonesia Unclassified	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
	5b. GRANT NUMBER		
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Gayagas, Christine ; Author	5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
	5e. TASK NUMBER		
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA17013-5050	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE ,			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.			
15. SUBJECT TERMS			
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  a. REPORT Unclassified	17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 30	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Rife, Dave RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil
b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number DSN
			Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Christine M. Gayagas

TITLE: Implications of Renewing US Military Ties with Indonesia

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 07 April 2003 PAGES: 30 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The US provided military aid to Indonesia for over 30 years, predominantly throughout anti-communist President Suharto's authoritarian reign during the Cold War. However, the US cut virtually all military ties with Indonesia in 1992 in response to allegations of Indonesian military human rights violations in efforts to repress the separatist movement in East Timor. But the current war on terrorism has renewed US interest in Indonesia. The US is now soliciting cooperation from strategically located Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world. With the country's fledgling economy, with radical extremist groups operating in Indonesia, and with porous borders in a 17,000-island archipelago, the US should consider programs to prevent the continued emergence of Indonesia as a safe haven for terrorists. Additionally, with the resignation of Suharto in 1998 and Indonesia's transition to the world's third largest democracy, its military force now legally serves under civilian control, rather than as henchmen for a ruthless dictator. Congress remains concerned about accountability for past human rights abuses, on-going separatist movements, and the Indonesian military's ability to transform. Should the US pursue reestablishment of military ties with Indonesia? What are the implications of such an initiative?



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	VII
IMPLICATIONS OF RENEWING US MILITARY TIES WITH INDONESIA.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
STRATEGIC RELEVANCE AND BACKGROUND.....	2
WHY ENGAGE WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY .....	8
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNS .....	14
CONCLUSION.....	16
WORD COUNT: 7163ENDNOTES.....	17
ENDNOTES.....	19
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	25



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to dedicate this research paper to the recent Dean of the US Army War College. COL Kevin Cunningham initially served as my research advisor. Regrettably, he suddenly passed away due to an aggressive cancer. His willingness to accept the task as my advisor, his succinct guidance, academic acumen, and amiable personality will always serve as an inspiration to me as a developing strategic leader.



## IMPLICATIONS OF RENEWING US MILITARY TIES WITH INDONESIA

The world is a dangerous place to live, not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it.

—Albert Einstein

### INTRODUCTION

The sub-region of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, is vulnerable to instability from political turmoil, ethnic conflict, separatist movements, and more recently, terrorism.<sup>1</sup> The US believes stability in Southeast Asia will prevent the domination of the region by an unfriendly power, assure US political and economic access and influence, and ensure peace and prosperity of the region. Key contributions to enduring peace come from political, economic, and cooperative security arrangements.<sup>2</sup>

For many years following Indonesia's independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1945, the US maintained ties with the Indonesian military. For decades, the US supported Suharto's 30-year reign which entailed pursuit of high economic growth, and national unity without democratic political participation, accountability, and transparency.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the US provided support, including military aid, to Indonesia during the Cold War to support Suharto's anti-communist actions.<sup>4</sup> The US reinforced support to Indonesia in 1967 when Indonesia became the pillar of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a new US-backed informal regional security system.<sup>5</sup> But in 1992, the US began a major shift in its policy and began to drastically reduce military aid to the Indonesian military because of the military's human rights abuses against innocent civilians in a cemetery in Dili, East Timor. Congress further restricted its military ties with Indonesia as a result of allegations of gross human rights violations in August 1999 in East Timor when East Timor declared its independence from Indonesia.<sup>6</sup>

In light of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, anti-terrorism has become a defining goal of US foreign policy, resulting in a reappraisal of US foreign relations. In the post 9-11 era, US policymakers have solicited greater cooperation from Indonesia in the war against terrorism. The US has increased its attention on Indonesia as the most populous Muslim nation in the world and as an evolving strategic landscape in Southeast Asia. Beyond the war on terrorism, Indonesia is a strategic gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, sits on unique sea lines of communication, and has been one of the backbones of ASEAN.<sup>7</sup> A unified, prosperous, and democratic Indonesia is key to Southeast Asian regional stability.

Although the US already provides economic and development assistance to Indonesia, Presidents Bush and Megawati agreed that the US could help Indonesia improve its counter-

terrorism capabilities. But the plans for achieving this have not yet been determined. During a visit to Jakarta on 3 August 2002 with Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, Secretary of State Colin Powell pledged support and encouraged initiatives to move forward in establishing greater cooperation with the Indonesian military and police forces. Powell indicated that the bulk of the \$50 million in aid would support counter-terrorism efforts, while \$4 million would include funding for the military in Individual Military Education and Training (IMET) to improve capabilities, standards, and military performance. He stressed that accountability was still important.<sup>8</sup> So senior US officials are aggressively reviewing Theater Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific region and our military relations with Indonesia.

The Indonesian military has played an important role in the leadership of the country since its break from Dutch colonial rule. The military transcends all aspects of Indonesian society. Most observers recognize that the military must reform to resolve human rights issues and function in an emerging democracy. But is reestablishing military ties with Indonesia essential in meeting US national security objectives and winning the war on terrorism?

This SRP assesses whether the US should reestablish military ties with Indonesia, analyzing implications of enhancing the US-Indonesian military relationship. It describes the new landscape and discusses the impetus for a more involved theater security cooperation plan between the militaries. Has the US focus on the war on terrorism lent greater importance to reestablishing military ties with the Indonesian military? Will increased military ties with Indonesia help the US meet its national security objectives of protecting vital interests and combating terrorism, while at the same time still supporting goals of establishing and consolidating democracy and upholding human rights? In order to answer these questions, this SRP will first address the strategic importance of Indonesia and its complex history including the military's role during Suharto's 30-year rule. The paper will then examine the rationale for renewed engagement with the Indonesian military, discussing its implications for regional stability, its possible contributions to the war on terrorism, and the future of Indonesian armed forces. It concludes with specific recommendations regarding US military aid to Indonesia.

## **STRATEGIC RELEVANCE AND BACKGROUND**

Along with Indonesia's vital cooperation in the war against terrorism, the US has important security, political, economic, commercial, and democratic nation-building interests in Indonesia. With access to internationally recognized sea-lanes and straits, its strategic location makes it a US interest. Following the collapse of Suharto's 30-year dictatorship, formerly useful as a geopolitical chess piece in the game against communism, Indonesia is currently undergoing a

turbulent transition to a more democratic society. The Republic is struggling to hold together after years of corruption created and exacerbated by internal contradictions and fractures along class, ethnic, religious, regional, and institutional lines.<sup>9</sup> The country now faces significant challenges in dealing with separatist movements throughout the archipelago, fighting corruption, establishing the rule of law, and undertaking structural economic reforms that will help restore economic growth and further integrate Indonesia into the global economy.

The US government employs political, military, and economic means to carry out the nation's foreign policies. The US ability to provide aid through each of these mechanisms can positively influence a country that needs an entire spectrum of assistance. In support of Indonesia's efforts to transition to a democracy, the Department of State (DOS) is requesting over \$142 million in aid to Indonesia for FY03. This request includes \$71.4 million in Development Assistance (DA), up from \$38.7 million in FY02, to support institutions critical to democratic governance, including independent advocacy centers for human rights, impartial electoral structures, and an independent and transparent judiciary. On the economic front, the DOS request includes \$60 million for the Economic Support Funds (ESF), up from \$50 million in FY02, to back the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-directed Indonesian economic stabilization and structural reform program. The Department of Treasury will also provide USAID funds for technical assistance and training in micro-enterprise, economic growth projects, and related activities.<sup>10</sup>

Of the approximately \$142 million that the State Department provides for Indonesia, only \$400k in FY02 and FY03, up from \$0 in FY01, is currently available for the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program in Indonesia. These funds are designated only for civilians; they are designated to promote broader civilian control and oversight of the Indonesia Armed Forces. While there is a great need to educate civilians to oversee the military, this apportionment will have only a minimal impact. Currently, any expanded military cooperation with Indonesia is contingent on improving the military's human rights practices and accountability for past abuses.<sup>11</sup> Although there is a Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Fund (RDCTF) which Congress approved for counter-terrorism courses in FY02, its current restrictions will not help develop a more professional Indonesian military or foster enhanced theater security cooperation.<sup>12</sup> Thus, congressional restrictions limit our current means to influence Indonesia and the policy focus is exclusively on political and economic efforts.

Indeed the Indonesian military's corruption and human rights abuses surely discourage outside assistance and their past abuses warranted scrutiny from Congress. But the military is

a means to help influence the Indonesian government because the military has been a dominant force in the country's political and social life. In order to understand the role that the military played under Suharto's rule, one must also learn about the concept of 'dwifungsi', which gave the military a dual function of enforcing policy under Suharto and providing security for the country.<sup>13</sup> As such, the military has been so intricately woven into the texture of Indonesian culture, it simply can not be excluded in overall efforts to rebuild the country into a more democratic society.

One of the obstacles in fully establishing a democracy in Indonesia is the lack of subordination of the military to civilian rule. The Indonesian military was used extensively during the Suharto era to implement his policies to suppress or destabilize potential political adversaries, and to fight Islamic fanatics. The military executed Suharto's policies as part of their dwifungsi doctrine. The military still maintains a role in Indonesia's current government structure where there are two assemblies, the parliament, commonly known as the DPR, and the super-parliament or People's Consultative Assembly referred to as the MPR. Historically, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) or Indonesian army forces played an active, visible role in Indonesian politics. The TNI held 20% of the seats (100 of 500) in the DPR under Suharto. Legislative reforms have reduced the number of TNI seats in the DPR to 38 and the TNI will surrender the remainder of their seats not later than the 2004 national election. Thereafter, the TNI will still have representation in the MPR until 2009 with 38 of the 700 seats.<sup>14</sup> Although Indonesia has a democratically elected president today, the political elite continues to recognize the military's latent power and remains wary of the security services. Many political leaders realize they do not have a free hand to deal with the military, so current political leaders woo the TNI leadership to provide backing and political support.<sup>15</sup> Although the trend of removing the military from its political role is favorable, it is not changing easily or quickly. To better establish a healthy civil-military relationship, the TNI must continue to reduce its political activities and concentrate on the professionalism of their force.<sup>16</sup>

Another concept to understand as part of the military's dwifungsi mission is the role that military forces played in the country's social life. Specifically, the Kodam forces were units which consisted of combat battalions that were predominantly assigned to territorial areas and "networked" into the local scene.<sup>17</sup> Since the resignation of Suharto in 1998, the army's territorial Kodam forces have been significantly reduced. These forces no longer control and influence all aspects of community life. Indeed they are generally well-behaved and accordingly well received and respected. However, the military's presence in all Indonesian territories and many businesses still gives it leverage over local politicians, and it can tend to exercise a heavy

hand in the operations of these businesses.<sup>18</sup> Although the military may not have the same influence as it did during Suharto's authoritarian rule, it continues to unduly influence many aspects of Indonesian society.

The Indonesian military has a history of corruption that is at least partially a result of lack of adequate pay for its forces. Salaries remain so artificially low that it is virtually impossible to support a family on "official" pay and allowances for any length of time. An Indonesian officer or enlisted man makes about one-fortieth (1/40) of military counterparts in Australia, Singapore, Japan or the US. Although costs of living are lower in Indonesia, they are not proportionately that much lower.<sup>19</sup> Low pay prompted the military to start entering commercial businesses for survival. Military businesses provide options for other employment to service men, outside pay to augment their low military salaries, and opportunities for retired military to transition to military businesses and supplement their dismal retirement pay.<sup>20</sup> Military foundations run banks, logging concessions, an airline, and other businesses that fund about 70% of the military's budget. Corruption is common throughout businesses and government in Indonesia. However, the military is remarkably rated second in the public's perception of 35 public institutions (post office rated higher).<sup>21</sup> Indonesia's struggle following the 1997 Asian financial crisis and its current weak economy make it difficult for the military to seek funding directly from the government. Despite their challenges to obtain full government funding, to receive decent pay, and to transform their accounting, the TNI must make greater strides in accounting for expenditures and improving transparency of funds.

Another significant area of concern for the US is the Indonesian military's history of human rights abuses noted as early as 1965. Although political groups and other parties have allegedly also been involved in past human rights abuse incidents, the alleged military perpetrators have never been seriously held accountable.<sup>22</sup> In 1974, Indonesia shocked the US when they annexed East Timor by force, took over this Portuguese colony, and violated human rights. The US never officially condemned the abuses or annexation through the United Nations, and it continued normal relations with Indonesia. The fact that this took place during the Cold War played a role in US inaction since Indonesia allowed the US to move nuclear submarines undetected by Soviet satellite on a route north of Timor.<sup>23</sup> However, following the Cold War, the US took action after a highly publicized human rights violation. On 12 November 1991, the Indonesian Army shot at least 19 unarmed civilians in a premeditated manner at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor. Two American reporters covered the event and raised US awareness of the military's brutality.<sup>24</sup> Although the State and Defense departments objected,

the US Congress cancelled \$2.3 million in IMET funds in 1992 in response to the highly publicized gross human rights abuses.<sup>25</sup>

Over the next several years, US engagement generally declined, despite periods of vacillating authorizations on limited engagement. In 1993, a revised program known as E-IMET was restored to provide training limited to judicial and human rights activities along with other unobjectionable programs. After 1993, the US continued to provide “soldier to soldier” training to Indonesian military units under the Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET) program. In 1994, although limited E-IMET and JCET continued, the US also banned the sale of small and light arms and riot-control equipment to Indonesia. In 1995 and 1996, the list included helicopter equipment and armored personnel carriers. Despite further restrictions on military sales to Indonesia, Congress authorized E-IMET funding for Indonesia for FY96 and FY97.<sup>26</sup> These E-IMET and JCET activities continued on a reduced basis under the aegis of the US Pacific Command (PACOM) until 1998, when the program was suspended after it came under political attack. A Dana Priest article reported that the US had conducted 41 JCETs with the Indonesian Special Forces or Kopassus while 11 Kopassus members were detained in connection with kidnapping, torture, and the disappearance of numerous political activists.<sup>27</sup> Although it did not specify whether the 11 members had actually been trained by the US, the association was damaging enough to warrant further restrictions to JCETs. There were recommendations throughout the Clinton administration to restore full IMET for Indonesia, but divisions within the administration and congressional opposition blocked action.<sup>28</sup>

The greatest restrictions were implemented in the wake of violence in East Timor following the 31 August 1999 independence referendum. The Indonesian military and militia sponsored by the military exacerbated their tenuous relationship with the US by committing more egregious human rights abuses. In East Timor, hundreds of civilians were brutally killed as the world watched. The Clinton administration immediately suspended the transfer of defense articles and services to Indonesia in addition to suspending military exercises and exchanges. The Leahy Amendment followed, named after its author Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), and put into law the ban on military training and weapons transfers in Section 489 of the FY2000 Foreign Operations appropriations.<sup>29</sup>

However in March 2000 following Under Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering's visit to Jakarta, the Clinton administration successfully resumed limited military cooperation permitted by legislative amendments. Participation by the Indonesian military was minimal; ten Indonesian Air Force officers participated in the annual multi-national Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand. In September 2000, the US granted a waiver for commercial sales of C-130 spare

parts. But these limited efforts to rebuild military ties were thwarted when the Indonesian militia killed three United Nations workers in West Timor.<sup>30</sup>

The Leahy Amendment was extended into FY2001 and FY2002 and expanded conditions that the Indonesian military must meet to receive aid, including requirements to improve transparency in the Indonesian military budget.<sup>31</sup> The H.R. 2506, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, Section 572 cites criteria for providing military assistance to Indonesia. This amendment specifies that IMET and the Foreign Military Financing Program may be available for Indonesian military personnel only if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are:

1. taking effective measures to bring to justice members of the armed forces and militia groups against whom there is credible evidence of human rights violations in East Timor and Indonesia or credible evidence of aiding and abetting illegal militia groups in East Timor and Indonesia;
2. demonstrating a commitment to accountability by cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of members of the armed forces and militia groups responsible for human rights violations in East Timor and Indonesia;
3. demonstrating a commitment to civilian control of the armed forces by reporting to civilian authorities audits of receipts and expenditures of the armed forces; and
4. allowing the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations and representatives of recognized human rights organizations access to West Timor, Aceh, West Papua, and Maluku, and releasing political detainees.<sup>32</sup>

Clearly, prior to 11 September 2001, Congress was continuing a trend of increased requirements for accountability in the Indonesian military before Congress would consider any requests for an exception to provide aid.

The FY02 Defense Appropriations version of the Leahy Amendment did not include any provisions for military aid or sales but addressed the possibility for training. It allowed the Secretary of Defense to authorize training of the Indonesian military, but only with a waiver if he determined that "extraordinary circumstances" required it. If the Secretary authorized a waiver, within fifteen days he had to submit a report to the congressional defense committees. The report had to describe the extraordinary circumstances for the waiver, the purpose and duration of the training program, and the information relating to human rights violations that necessitated the waiver.<sup>33</sup> Clearly, there were still restricted means to influence the Indonesian military. Recently congress eased restrictions in a FY03 joint resolution, which made the Foreign Military

Financing Program available for Indonesia. The resolution permits the export of lethal defense articles only if the President certifies that the Indonesian Minister of Defense (MOD) is suspending and prosecuting members alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or aided militia groups. It also requires the Minister to make its accounting procedures transparent.<sup>34</sup> With few exceptions, Indonesian military personnel have had little exposure to U.S. training since 1992. Until 11 September 01, the Bush administration made no serious attempts to request any waivers.

### **WHY ENGAGE WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY**

Following the September 01 attacks in the US, there has been new impetus for restoring military ties with Indonesia. The tide seemed to shift toward influencing the Indonesian government with incentives rather than influencing it with sanctions. President Megawati was one of the first presidents to visit Washington in September 2001 and provide her support to the US for the war on terrorism. The US responded to her gesture with a pledge of \$530 million in aid and loan guarantees for Indonesia and \$50 million in aid disbursed over four years for the counter-terrorism fight.<sup>35</sup> Many see advantages in expanding military engagement with Indonesia to meet our national security objectives in the war on terrorism. Our National Security Strategy (NSS) also addresses supporting democracy and Indonesia is in its nascent stages of establishing a fully democratic nation. Our NSS specifically acknowledges Indonesia's initiatives to build a democratic nation and supports Indonesia's efforts.<sup>36</sup> However, US initiatives to further relations with the Indonesian military remain under scrutiny due to Indonesia's dreadful human rights record.

A critical US activity in helping to shape other countries is military relations. If US policy objectives are to be attained in Indonesia, then military relations must be pursued in conjunction with the other elements of national power.<sup>37</sup> Military relations with Indonesia are not the sole answer to that country's vast challenges or to meeting our national security objectives. But it is worth the effort to establish better cooperation with the TNI. This is crucial because the Indonesian armed forces currently exercise enormous political influence and play a prominent role in Indonesian national security policymaking. As the most admired and respected armed forces in the world, the US military provides an ideal example of a dynamic defense establishment that is under civilian control, that is governed by rule of law, and that serves a democratic political system. The US should maximize its ability to influence others in support of our NSS objectives. Although it is not realistic to expect dramatic short-term results from

military engagement, we should engage in long-term efforts on matters of substance to further national interests.<sup>38</sup>

The most significant advantages of renewed military ties include the positive impact that a professional Indonesian Army can have on regional stability, the Indonesian military's ability to enhance the war on terrorism, the likelihood of handling separatist movements with greater restraint and professionalism, and the opportunity to positively influence the officers and an institution that have been devoid of any significant western influence for over a decade.

There are several reasons why the US has a vested interest in the professionalism of the Indonesian military. One reason is that professional and mutually supportive security forces limit the temptation of others to resolve disputes by force, while providing incentives for diplomatic solutions.<sup>39</sup> US supported actions such as NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises and CENTCOM's support in creating joint peacekeeping units with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, are helping to maintain regional stability. These efforts also help dissuade other regional powers from seeking to dominate the region and deter efforts by extremists to create instability.<sup>40</sup> US assistance to Indonesia can further recognize Indonesia's key role in regional security and it could also help to ensure US access to Indonesia's airspace and strategic sea-lanes.<sup>41</sup> To support US efforts to maintain regional stability in Southeast Asia, Indonesia must maintain its armed forces as a professional institution that is ready to fight.

The US also has a vested interest in ensuring that the Indonesian military does not further languish; it should be reformed to perform in a professional manner when called upon whether it is for the war on terrorism, separatist activities, or civil unrest. After almost a decade of limited training with the US military and deprived of critical riot control and weapons and vehicle parts, the Indonesian military is understandably not viewed overall as a highly proficient or professional force.<sup>42</sup> The US embargo on selling of parts, professional military education, technical training, and technical assistance visits has taken a toll. Although the US embargo itself did not seriously degrade the readiness of some units, their overall ability to respond rapidly by air or naval transport in a large archipelago has been negatively affected, largely because there are insufficient parts available to repair much of the US-procured equipment.<sup>43</sup>

Another reason the US is concerned about the Indonesian military is that they could seek support from countries that may be unfriendly to the US, which may undermine US strategy and not be in the best interest of the US. In 1997, Indonesia announced plans to acquire Russian missiles and helicopters due to repeated postponements in the US sale of F-16 aircraft.<sup>44</sup> If the US does not engage or provide the opportunity to influence Indonesia through education or possible foreign military sales, other countries, including China, will continue to attempt to fill the

void. Further, the US would accept political risk in the long term by allowing potential adversaries to influence Indonesia and further destabilize the region. Continued inaction could ultimately create a significant political backlash; sustaining Indonesia's support in the region should remain a consideration in US policy on military engagement.

Another important issue involving the Indonesian military and regional stability is the ability of their military to operate in a UN-led multi-national force or in a US military environment. In addition to equipment readiness challenges, it is doubtful that their military can serve with other professional forces because they operate under a totally different values system. The Indonesian military lacks discipline and their system, which includes corporal punishment, tends to incite aggressive behavior.<sup>45</sup> Almost incomprehensible to western forces is the fact that their leadership subtly condones immoral behavior as evidenced by the well known "Kissing House" in East Timor. This name came from the lipstick marks on the house walls where Indonesian soldiers pushed their rape victims against the wall.<sup>46</sup> Other international forces in East Timor maintained their distance from the TNI's ill-disciplined soldiers, which clearly lacked an acceptable values system. US training of key officers about respect for human dignity could help influence their military and values system and thereby improve the ability of their military to serve in a combined environment. Despite the fact that there are minimal external threats to Indonesia, the military needs to be disciplined and proficient to operate with professional forces within ASEAN, and the UN, or with the US military. Additionally Indonesia trained an infantry battalion to participate with US troops in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as part of the war on terrorism. The US has a vested interest in their readiness and professionalism if Indonesian troops are called upon to serve side by side in the war on terrorism.<sup>47</sup>

In addition to helping maintain regional stability, expanded military engagement could be a key mechanism to promote Indonesia's integration into western political-military institutions and encourage civilian control over militaries.<sup>48</sup> Since the Indonesian military has operated under its dwifungsi doctrine for over 30 years, the civilian government does not have experience or assistance to transform its relationship with the military. Military engagement could heighten the Indonesian military's awareness of the principles of good civil-military relations and reinforce the TNI's commitment to reform.<sup>49</sup> It could also improve the overall professionalism and readiness of the Indonesian armed forces by exposing their military to U.S. military procedures and the manner in which our military functions under civilian control.

Another important aspect of renewing military ties with Indonesia is the impact it could have on the war on terrorism. The National War College study on combating terrorism reported that the fight against terrorism requires a multidimensional, multinational approach aimed at the

entire spectrum of terrorism. This war demands collaboration, and the US should encourage all civilized societies to pool diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to defeat terrorist organizations wherever they exist, to deter future acts of terrorism, and ultimately to diminish the underlying causes of terrorism. The economic and diplomatic dimensions of national power focus on developing an environment favorable to sustaining economic growth and providing development assistance to promote accountable and participatory governance.<sup>50</sup> Senior US officials recognize that Indonesia, as the most populous Muslim nation in a key strategic location, is instrumental to the war on terrorism.

Together the US and Indonesia could more effectively defeat terrorist organizations. Certainly there are many non-military contributions to the war on terrorism, such as monitoring of VISAs and financial transactions and improving aircraft safety. Even so, military engagement is a key component in the overall effort to defeat terrorist organizations in Indonesia.<sup>51</sup> The Indonesian Police Force, or POLRI, which recently separated from the Indonesian Army as part of the security forces, has the lead in combating terrorism and is the focus of US aid. Unfortunately, they lack the capability to conduct counter-terrorism and are having trouble maintaining law and order, so the military plays a greater role in countering terrorism.<sup>52</sup> The Special Forces component of the Indonesian military, the Kopassus, has a key role to specifically train and conduct anti-terrorist missions.<sup>53</sup> But, even a more competent police force would rely on the military's logistics and transportation support, which is currently lacking due to US sanctions.<sup>54</sup> The US Army is also providing assistance to the Philippine Army to ensure they have the proper skills and training to combat terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG).<sup>55</sup>

Indonesia is especially vulnerable to terrorist threats, as evidenced by the 12 October 2002 bombing in Bali. Although most Muslims in Indonesia are moderate, there are small groups that tend toward radicalism.<sup>56</sup> Investigations in the Bali bombing incident are also proving that the terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah or JI, has links in Indonesia. To date, there have been over 30 JI members arrested and testimony provided that implicates Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, JI's leader.<sup>57</sup> Despite disputes about whether there are further links between Islamic militant groups in Indonesia and Al Qaeda terrorists, there are at least certain sympathetic organizations in these militant groups. There is also great potential for outside groups to transit through Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia, as they foster extremist or terrorist behavior.<sup>58</sup> Terrorist groups can take advantage of vulnerable extremist situations, create havens in Indonesia, and thereby further incite extremist groups for terrorist causes. The US

could assist Indonesia by providing improved intelligence and enhancing their ability to share valuable intelligence with allies to prevent establishment of further terrorist networks in this vulnerable country.

In the National War College study, the third key element for abolishing terrorism is to diminish the underlying conditions that foster the formation of terrorist groups and their support elements. The study recommends that the US and its allies should directly or indirectly engage vulnerable regions and disparate ideologies and peoples. Among the contributors to the underlying causes of terrorism are social and economic inequity, poor governance, and illiteracy and lack of education that lead to widespread ignorance about the modern world and resentment toward Western values.<sup>59</sup> Unfortunately, current restrictions on interaction with the TNI limit the US military's ability to influence powerful Indonesian military leaders, which has shifted from predominantly Christian to Muslim.<sup>60</sup> Continued shunning of the military has strengthened the hand of factions intent on promoting anti-Western, anti-US and anti-Christian agendas.<sup>61</sup> Exposure to western democratic values could also help reduce the isolationism of the military and help open minds.<sup>62</sup> Working positively with more Muslim leaders can help the war on terrorism by clarifying Muslims' misperceptions of US values and culture. It is also no accident that the Indonesian military leaders who led the effort to transform the military, to resist extremists, and to argue for moderation all have advanced degrees from US institutions.<sup>63</sup> A lost generation of US-trained officers creates a greater challenge to reform the Indonesian military and for them to understand and to promote a better understanding and appreciation of US values in a professional army.

The scope of the military's role is not limited to external security and combating terrorism. The military is itself assigned to control numerous separatist movements and is often accused of civilian atrocities. Indonesia continues to deal with separatist movements in Aceh, where the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) battles for independence in the northwestern island of Indonesia. Human Rights groups report that the military solution in Aceh thwarts dialogues for peace and that the death toll exceeds an average of 100 a month. A 1999 Indonesian Presidential commission also concluded that there were 7,000 human rights violations from 1989 to 1998 in military operational zones.<sup>64</sup> Irian Jaya, or West Papua, is also an area in the eastern part of the country with a violent separatist movement and this conflict could increase the military's opportunity for misconduct.

The US can assist to quell the violence in these separatist movement areas by providing military aid to obtain quality anti-riot equipment or simply by lifting the ban to procure the equipment. The ban has caused the security forces to procure cheap equipment, which did not

allow soldiers to adequately defend themselves. Soldiers then reverted to higher levels of force protection and used unnecessary, heavy handed tactics, which were counterproductive and created further support for terrorism.<sup>65</sup> Again, US military engagement in teaching proper restraint with quality equipment could facilitate a better handling of separatist demonstrations. Training and influence cannot eliminate all risk of future atrocities, but they could help reduce anti-military sentiments and help eliminate the conditions that support terrorist activities.

Although renewed ties with the Indonesian military pose some risk for the US, Congress has demonstrated that the US is willing to take risk with countries that further US interests. The NSS encouraged US officials to pursue support from Indonesia in the war on terrorism. The strategy also alludes to certain actions that Indonesia must take to gain US assistance: “Indonesia may be able to employ the engine of opportunity that has helped lift some of its neighbors out of poverty and desperation. It is the initiative by Indonesia that allows US assistance to make a difference.”<sup>66</sup> This statement subtly refers to increased US aid to Pakistan, which bolstered relationships and influenced Pakistan’s choice to join the war on terrorism and move toward building a more open society. The US has depended on Pakistan for “critical support” in the war on terrorism, particularly with on-going military action in neighboring Afghanistan. This has been a remarkable turnaround considering the sanctions that were previously imposed on Pakistan for its human rights violations and testing of nuclear weapons.<sup>67</sup> The US is also fully engaged with Malaysia for their support in the war on terrorism, although Prime Minister Mahathir violated human rights by his contentious detention of political prisoner Anwar Ibrahim.<sup>68</sup> Thus US senior leaders are willing to take demonstrable risks and are primarily focusing on the short-term positive aspects of increased relations with countries that can help in the war on terrorism.

The Bush Administration is now demonstrating that it is willing to take risk with regard to Indonesia and supported the FY03 proposal that virtually eliminates restrictions for IMET and dramatically reduces the stringent criteria that must be met in order to sell military items to Indonesia. These efforts to reinvigorate military contacts with Indonesia are apparent in the FY03 \$400k proposal for IMET, which focuses on key areas to enhance the Indonesian Defense System reform efforts. At present, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees voted to approve the proposals but they must undergo the scrutiny of any debates on the House and Senate floors prior to final voting.<sup>69</sup> Although there is clearly an effort to continue pressure on Indonesia to resolve human rights abuses, funds may now be appropriated by this act under the heading of ‘Foreign Military Financing Program’ for assistance for Indonesia. Further, lethal defense articles may be licensed for export to Indonesia. However, the President must certify to

the appropriate congressional committees that the Indonesian Minister of Defense is suspending from the Armed Forces those members, of whatever rank, who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, or to have aided or abetted militia groups. It also requires that the Indonesian government prosecute and punish those members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, of whatever rank, who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, or to have aided or abetted militia groups, and that Indonesian Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in such cases (including providing access to witnesses, relevant military documents, and other requested information). To further encourage transparency of the armed forces, the Minister of Defense must make publicly available audits of receipts and expenditures of the Indonesian Armed Forces, including audits of receipts from private enterprises and foundations. The US now seems ready to re-engage in IMET programs and sell lethal items to Indonesia.

#### **HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNS**

Current efforts to reestablish military ties have not gone unnoticed by human rights organizations. In addition to the history of human rights abuses, negative reports challenge the slow and faulty progress of holding alleged perpetrators accountable. These reports influence public opinion and give the impression that the US does not care about respect for human rights. Most human rights organizations see military aid to Indonesia as contradicting our own national policy for respecting human dignity by engaging with human rights violators.

In August 2001, the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights formed a Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations. Although they have summoned generals suspected of human rights abuses, none of them have responded. The suspected generals based their rationale for not appearing on the contested legality of the commission. To exacerbate the situation from the human rights perspective, the TNI promoted and reshuffled a number of generals to key positions in February 2002. Included in the moves were General Sjafrrie Sjamsuddin, the former Jakarta Military Commander accused of being responsible for the May 1998 violence that led to the death of students and victims of chaos in Jakarta, who became the Army's spokesman. General Tono Suratman, a former commander of East Timor's Wiradharma Military Resorto, accused of being responsible for brutal murders following the East Timor independence referendum, was promoted and placed in higher positions of responsibility.<sup>70</sup>

Of the cases that have gone to trial, guilty pleas and light sentences were less consequential because the Indonesian human rights laws fall short of international standards.<sup>71</sup>

Although an international commission, rather than an internal Indonesian commission, may help with establishing a higher standard of accountability, US support for this effort will lack credibility without US backing for the International Criminal Court system. Regardless of the method, the US and other countries should continue to push for accountability of past and present human rights abuses.

Despite long delays and some disappointing sentences of guilty officers, Indonesia is making progress in addressing the human rights issue. To the surprise of many human rights organizations, an Indonesian court reviewed the sentencing of three guilty Indonesian military men and extended their sentences. This certainly helped demonstrate their willingness to push for full accountability.<sup>72</sup> Additionally, on 27 December 2002, an Indonesian human rights court convicted LTC Soejarwo, the first officer and Commander of the Indonesian military command in Dili, East Timor, for failing to prevent pro-Jakarta militias from attacking unarmed civilians, days after the referendum vote. But again, some human rights activists were not satisfied that his jail term was five years, half of what prosecutors were seeking, and that he will remain at liberty until his appeal is heard.<sup>73</sup> However, it would not be appropriate for the government to interfere with legal proceedings and further influence the courts to alter sentences for those found guilty.

Although the military has made some improvements in resolving previous human rights abuse violations during the East Timor independence referendum, the Indonesian military may be implicated in a recent murder of two Americans found on 31 August 2002 in Timika in the vicinity of the Grasberg copper mine, a US-owned company. Forensic tests showed that M-16, SS-1, and Mauser rifles were used in the attack and police said they have evidence indicating rogue elements of the Indonesia military may have been involved in the attack.<sup>74</sup> Appropriately, the US has issued a demarche demanding a full and cooperative investigation to determine culpability. Should the investigation implicate the Indonesian military, it is likely that the US will demand the extradition of the suspects to the US for prosecution. This incident could delay approval of military aid to Indonesia.

More importantly, the US must approach the war on terrorism thoughtfully to ensure that short-term objectives do not override broad long-term goals to build a stable and responsive Indonesian government. Policies and programs designed to enhance the professionalism of the military could be interpreted as supporting a return of the armed forces to a more dominant political role. Along with President Megawati clamping down on Islamic extremism, US assistance could risk polarizing the country, enabling radical Islamists to exploit Indonesian nationalism and portray themselves as defenders of religion.<sup>75</sup> This unintended result would be contradictory to meeting US objectives. However, by employing caution in the method with

which we provide scrutinized assistance to Indonesia, we could mitigate the risk in fueling extremism.

## **CONCLUSION.**

This analysis has led the reader from a complex background of the military in Indonesia under authoritarian rule in the Cold War to their transitioning role in a fractious democratic country, to potential roles in the War on Terrorism. The conclusion is that the Bush administration should proceed in reestablishing military ties in Indonesia, but to proceed with caution. Although there are many projected advantages to engaging the Indonesian military, there is risk in appearing to support a rogue military that continues to violate human rights. For many reasons, a professional military force in Indonesia is desirable, and it is likely that US engagement will enhance the Indonesian military's acceptance of civil rule and respect for human dignity. The ultimate US objectives, through support to their military, are to stabilize the country, to prevent further creation of terrorist havens, and to minimize conditions for extremist Muslims to take advantage of a weak government. Closely monitored US support to the Indonesian military will help meet these NSS objectives.

US leaders should continue to support the primary national security objective of winning the war on terrorism. Toward this end, leaders should encourage engagement with the Indonesian military to enhance efforts in the war on terrorism. Yet we must fully understand the potential risks of engagement with their military, which needs much more reform. It is imperative that the US provide any aid in subtle and indirect ways. It would not be prudent to arrogantly and blatantly publicize US involvement. Additionally, to minimize the risk of repercussions for potential military acts that the US does not condone, the US must constantly monitor training and aid. The Indonesian country team, the joint staff, and the Pacific Combatant Commander should continue to coordinate the types of training offered to the Indonesian military forces, screen units and individuals for their propensity to positively influence other Indonesian forces, and continue to closely monitor the military's human rights record. If blatant abuses surface in the military, they would warrant another evaluation of the level of military aid. However, we should not overlook the impact that the Indonesian military has on its country and the risks of an Indonesian military that is devoid of any positive western influences.

There are also some general lessons gleaned from this assessment that may be applicable in future policy considerations. The first is that the US should clearly identify long-term objectives and ensure that actions to meet short-term objectives do not undermine the long-term interests. If US short-term policy conflicts with long-term interests, the policy must

include an approach that minimizes the conflict and mitigates the risk in meeting long-term goals. The second lesson is that US policy planners must understand regional history and civil-military relations when crafting policy. Although the Indonesian military has a litany of troubling issues, one who understands the potential of that military to influence developments in Indonesia can craft appropriate policy and identify the proper means to enhance US interests.

WORD COUNT: 7163



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Andrew Scobell, The U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2001) 17.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Abigail Abrash, "Indonesia After Suharto," Foreign Policy in Focus (December 1998): 3; [database on line]; available from Columbia International Affairs Online; accessed 30 September 2002.

<sup>4</sup> "Indonesia Foreign Relations," available from <[www.countrywatch.com](http://www.countrywatch.com)>; Internet; accessed 30 September 2002.

<sup>5</sup> Haseman, John, "The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power," 2002; available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1599/index.html>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>7</sup> Congress, House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee of the International Operations and Human Rights, Human Rights in Indonesia, 24 July 1998, 10 [database on line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed on 28 October 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Karen DeYoung, "Power Says U.S. to Resume Training Indonesia's Forces; Terrorism Fears Overtake Concerns About Army Abuses," The Washington Post, 3 August 2002, 3, [database on line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 30 September 2002.

<sup>9</sup> John Birmingham, "Appeasing Jakarta," Quarterly Essay, no. 2 (2001): 4.

<sup>10</sup> Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2003 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002) 259.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> LTC Jacquelyn Russell, "Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Fund," Information Paper, Camp Smith, HI, 23 October 02.

<sup>13</sup> John B. Haseman, "To Change a Military—The Indonesian Experience," Joint Force Quarterly, 25 (Summer 2000): 2 [database on line]; available from EBSCO Host; accessed 28 October 2002.

<sup>14</sup> COL (Ret.) Donald McFetridge, The Future of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2002) 12.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>16</sup> Haseman, "To Change a Military—The Indonesian Experience," 4.

<sup>17</sup> McFetridge, 29.

<sup>18</sup> "Indonesia's Armed Forces, Khaki Power," The Economist, 7 September 2002, 41.

<sup>19</sup> McFetridge, 55.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>22</sup> Andreas Harsono, "The Sensitive Question of Transitional Justice in Indonesia,"; available from <<http://www.carnegiecouncil.org>>; Internet: accessed 14 October 2002.

<sup>23</sup> Birmingham, 40.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>25</sup> Haseman, "The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power," 113.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 114-115.

<sup>27</sup> Congress, House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee of the International Operations and Human Rights, 11.

<sup>28</sup> Haseman, "The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power," 114.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 116.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>32</sup> LTC Paul Bartlett <[Paul.Bartlett@OSD.PENTAGON.MIL](mailto:Paul.Bartlett@OSD.PENTAGON.MIL)>, "Information on Indonesia," electronic mail message to LTC Christine Gayagas <[Christine.Gayagas@carlisle.army.mil](mailto:Christine.Gayagas@carlisle.army.mil)>, 7 November 2002.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Allan D. Langland <[LanglandAD@state.gov](mailto:LanglandAD@state.gov)>, "Indonesia Restrictions," electronic mail message to LTC Christine Gayagas <[Christine.Gayagas@carlisle.army.mil](mailto:Christine.Gayagas@carlisle.army.mil)>, 6 November 2002.

<sup>35</sup> Timothy Mapes, "Indonesian President Stands on Slippery Political Ground—If Megawati Aids US Effort, She courts the Wrath of Muslim Militants," The Wall Street Journal, 25 September, 2001, A.14.1 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 30 September 2002.

<sup>36</sup> George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 10.

<sup>37</sup> Scobell, 27.

<sup>38</sup> Scobell, 33.

<sup>39</sup> Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Remarks, National Resiliency Institute (Lemhannas), Jakarta, Indonesia, 27 November 2001; available from <<http://131.84.1.218/speeches/sst2001/011127lemhannas.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2002.

<sup>40</sup> Elizabeth Wishnick, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia, October 2002; available from <<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2002/usinrst/usinrst.pdf>>; Internet; accessed December 2002.

<sup>41</sup> Bartlett, 2.

<sup>42</sup> McFetridge, 17.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>44</sup> Haseman, "The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power," 115.

<sup>45</sup> McFetridge, 50.

<sup>46</sup> COL (P) Dave Chalmers, interview by author, 16 December 2002, Carlisle, PA.

<sup>47</sup> McFetridge, 27.

<sup>48</sup> Wishnick, 10. The author applied this concept to U.S. units training with militaries in the Central Asian region, but this concept could also be applied to Indonesia.

<sup>49</sup> Bartlett, 2.

<sup>50</sup> National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism, Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World, (Ft. McNair, DC, May 2002) xxii.

<sup>51</sup> Blair, 5.

<sup>52</sup> McFetridge, 15.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>54</sup> MAJ James Robinson, PACOM Joint Intelligence Agency Counter-Terrorism Task Force, interview by author, 23 December 2002, Camp Smith, HI.

<sup>55</sup> Admiral Dennis C. Blair, interview by Barry Wain, Asian Wall Street Journal and Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, Singapore, 1 December 2001; available from <<http://131.84.1.218/speeches/sst2001/011213wsj.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2002.

<sup>56</sup> DeYoung, 2.

<sup>57</sup> Robinson, 1.

<sup>58</sup> Blair interview, 2.

<sup>59</sup> National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism, xxii.

<sup>60</sup> McFetridge, 37.

<sup>61</sup> Professor Robert W. Hefner, Islam in Indonesia's Political Future (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2002), 48.

<sup>62</sup> McFetridge, 35.

<sup>63</sup> Lyall Breckon, Project Director, Indonesia's Future: Issues for the United States (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2002), 51.

<sup>64</sup> "Indonesian Activists Urge Congress to Block Military Training,"; available from <<http://www.etan.org/news/2002a/10indo.htm>>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2003.

<sup>65</sup> Blair, remarks, 6.

<sup>66</sup> Bush, 10.

<sup>67</sup> Wishnick, 6.

<sup>68</sup> Hefner, 45.

<sup>69</sup> Bartlett, 3.

<sup>70</sup> Tommi Legowo, "Indonesia's Political Reform: Still a Long Way to Go," Indonesia Quarterly 2 (Second Quarter 2002) 123.

<sup>71</sup> "RI Opens Historic East Timor Tribunal," The Jakarta Post, 14 March 2002; quoted in McFetridge, 47.

<sup>72</sup> "No More Jakarta Jive," The Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2002; sec. A.18 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 30 September 2002.

<sup>73</sup> "Officer Sentenced in Timor Violence," Honolulu Advertiser, Dec 28 2002, sec A.2.

<sup>74</sup> "Military Weapons Used in Shooting," Honolulu Advertiser, Dec 27 2002, sec A.12.

<sup>75</sup> Breckon, 47.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrash, Abigail. "Indonesia After Suharto," Foreign Policy in Focus. (December 1998): 1-7. Database on line. Available from Columbia International Affairs Online. Accessed 30 September 2002.

Bartlett, Paul, LTC <[Paul.Bartlett@OSD.PENTAGON.MIL](mailto:Paul.Bartlett@OSD.PENTAGON.MIL)>. "Information on Indonesia." Electronic mail message to LTC Christine Gayagas <[Christine.Gayagas@carlisle.army.mil](mailto:Christine.Gayagas@carlisle.army.mil)>. 7 November 2002.

Birmingham, John. "Appeasing Jakarta." Quarterly Essay, no. 2 (2001): 4

Blair, Admiral Dennis C. Interview with Barry Wain, Asian Wall Street Journal and Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune. Singapore, 1 December 2001. Available from <<http://131.84.1.218/speeches/sst2001/011213wsj.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 16 November 2002.

Blair, Admiral Dennis C. Statement. National Resiliency Institute (Lemhannas), Jakarta, Indonesia, 27 November 2001. Available from <<http://131.84.1.218/speeches/sst2001/011127lemhannas.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 16 November 2002.

Bush, George W. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.

Chalmers, Dave, Colonel (P). Australian Army assigned to the US Army War College, Class of 2003. Interview by author, 16 December 2002, Carlisle, PA.

Congress, House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee of the International Operations and Human Rights. Human Rights in Indonesia. 24 July 1998, 10 [Database on-line]. Available from Lexis-Nexis. Accessed on 28 October 2002.

Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2003 Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002.

DeYoung, Karen. "Power Says U.S. to Resume Training Indonesia's Forces; Terrorism Fears Overtake Concerns About Army Abuses." The Washington Post, 3 August 2002, 3, Database on line. Available from ProQuest. Accessed 30 September 2002.

Harsono, Andreas. "The Sensitive Question of Transitional Justice in Indonesia." Available from <<http://www.carnegiecouncil.org>>; Internet. Accessed 14 October 2002.

Haseman, John B. "The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power." 2002. Available from <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1599/index.html>>. Internet. Accessed 19 November 2002.

Haseman, John B. "To Change a Military—The Indonesian Experience," Joint Force Quarterly, 25 (Summer 2000): 2 [Database on –line]. Available from EBSCO Host. Accessed 28 October 2002.

Hefner, Professor Robert W. Islam in Indonesia's Political Future. Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2002.

"Indonesian Activists Urge Congress to Block Military Training."; Available from <<http://www.etan.org/news/2002a/10indo.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 6 January 2003.

"Indonesia's Armed Forces, Khaki Power." The Economist, 7 September 2002, 40-41.

"Indonesia Foreign Relations.": Available from <[www.countrywatch.com](http://www.countrywatch.com)>. Internet. Accessed 30 September 2002.

Legowo, Tommi. "Indonesia's Political Reform: Still a Long Way to Go." Indonesia Quarterly 2 (Second Quarter 2002): 117-123.

Mapes, Timothy. "Indonesian President Stands on Slippery Political Ground—If Megawati Aids US Effort, She courts the Wrath of Muslim Militants." The Wall Street Journal, 25 September, 2001, A.14.1. Database on-line. Available from ProQuest; Accessed 30 September 2002.

"Military Weapons Used in Shooting." Honolulu Advertiser, Dec 27 2002, sec A.12.

McFetridge, COL (Ret.) Donald. The Future of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2002.

National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism. Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World. Ft. McNair, DC, May 2002.

"No More Jakarta Jive." The Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2002; sec. A.18. Database on-line. Available from ProQuest. Accessed 30 September 2002.

"Officer Sentenced in Timor Violence." Honolulu Advertiser, Dec 28 2002, sec A.2.

Robinson, James, Major. Assigned to PACOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Combating Terrorism Task Force. Interview by author, 23 December 2002, Camp Smith, HI.

Russell, Jacquelyn, LTC. "Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Fund." Information Paper. Camp Smith, HI, 23 October 02.

Scobell, Andrew. The U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. April 2001.

Wishnick, Elizabeth. Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia. October 2002. Available from <<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2002/usinrst/usinrst.pdf>>. Internet. Accessed December 2002.